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Zeller 1
Assessing the Role of Transnational Networks of Support in Color Revolutions: Successes
and Failures in Georgia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia
Michael C. Zeller, University of Louisville
It is not important who votes or how, but it is extraordinarily important who counts the votes.
- Josef Stalin (attributed by his secretary, Boris Bazhanov)1
In the second decade after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, a sociopolitical
phenomenon developed in several post-Soviet states: color revolution movements. Political and
societal opposition, spurred by electoral fraud perpetrated by (semi-) authoritarian governments,
sought the restoration of their legitimate voting prerogatives and often the accompanying ouster
of the prevailing political regime.
The phrase “color revolution” typically applies to a series of democratic movements
produced in part by electoral fraud; while the term originally referred to movements in the
former Soviet Union that first appeared in the early 2000s, democratic and anti-authoritarian
movements in Asia and the Middle East have since been labeled “color revolutions.” Nonviolent resistance, a discernable international element, and student and youth activism number
among the prominent characteristics of these movements. A robust and assertive civil society
represents perhaps the most outstanding feature present in color revolutions. In these instances,
civil society is appropriately understood by the definition provided by Alfred Stepan and Juan
Linz: “that arena of the polity where self-organizing and relatively autonomous groups,
movements, and individuals attempt to articulate values, to create associations and solidarities,
and to advance their interests.”2

1

Bazhanov, Boris. Vospominaniya byvshchevo sekretarya Stalina. Parizh: Tretya Bolna, 1980.
Quote translated by author: “я считаю, что совершенно неважно, кто и как будет в партии голосовать; но
вот что чрезвычайно важно, это - кто и как будет считать голоса.”
2
Linz, Juan J., and Alfred Stepan. "Toward Consolidated Democracies." Journal of Democracy 7, no. 2 (1996): 15.
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This paper seeks to identify transnational democratic networks that countered (semi-)
authoritarian regimes in the form of color revolution movements, to examine how regimes have
responded to this existential threat, and to evaluate the importance of this dynamic in
determining the success or failure of color revolutions.

Theory Pertaining to Transnational Networks of Support and Color Revolutions
The phenomena of color revolutions sparked considerable academic inquisition into the
commonalities of the movements.

What preconditions and procedural developments

characterize a color revolution? Examining movements in Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine in the
early 2000s, Michael McFaul concludes that successful color revolutions shared at least seven
factors:
1) a semi-autocratic rather than fully autocratic regime; 2) an
unpopular incumbent; 3) a united and organized opposition; 4) an
ability to quickly drive home the point that voting results were
falsified, 5) enough independent media to inform citizens about
the falsified vote, 6) a political opposition capable of mobilizing
tens of thousands or more demonstrators to protest electoral fraud,
and 7) divisions among the regime’s coercive forces. 3
Factors four through six, however, implicate an un-enumerated factor: transnational networks of
support. Furthermore, the popularity of an incumbent executive as well as opposition unity may
be the result of network influence.
The organization and effectiveness of political opposition and the dispersion of
alternative sources of information (to those of the government) frequently depends on the
influence of domestic and international elements operating within the country. The intercession
in political affairs, either directly or indirectly, of foreign agencies and organizations can activate
or enhance heretofore dormant or underdeveloped nodes of political activity. Indeed, some non3

McFaul, Michael. “Transitions from Postcommunism.” Journal of Democracy 16, no. 3 (2005): 7.
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domestic actors interact with dynamic societal components and endeavor to foster a political
culture antithetical to the prevailing degree of autocracy in the governing regime.
The influence of these “transnational advocacy networks,” is presently undervalued and
generally misunderstood, according to scholars Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink. 4 They
define such networks as including “those actors working internationally on an issue, who are
bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and
of services.”5 That is, groups with common goals and similar temperaments (irrespective of
nationality) sometimes coalesce into interconnected associations for the purpose of maximizing
resources and efficacy. Within these value-oriented nexuses major actors “may include the
following: (1) international and domestic NGOs, research and advocacy organizations; (2) local
social movements; (3) foundations; (4) the media; (5) churches, trade unions, consumer
organizations, intellectuals; (6) parts of regional and international intergovernmental
organizations; (7) parts of the executive and/or parliamentary branches of governments.”6
Transnational advocacy networks frequently develop out of claims of rights violations,
necessarily involving some government(s).
Governments are the primary ‘guarantors’ of rights, but also
among their primary violators. When a government violates or
refuses to recognize rights, individuals and domestic groups often
have no recourse within domestic political or judicial arenas. They
may seek international connections to express their concerns and
even to protect their lives.7
Keck and Sikkink call this search for international support so as to aggregate and exert greater
pressure on a state “the boomerang pattern.” The enlistment of outside support multiplies the
4

Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics.
Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1998.
5
Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. “Transnational advocacy networks in international and regional politics.”
International Social Science Journal 51, no. 159 (1999): 89.
6
Ibid: 91 – 92.
7
Ibid: 93.
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force of a domestic actor’s (actors’) effect and impairs the ability of disinclined governments to
ignore or repress the issue being presented. Relationships and collaboration among the various
network constituents quickly becomes elaborate.

The interaction, according to Keck and

Sikkink, is dynamic; exchanges of funds and other resources, services, and information occur
frequently inside “a dense web of connections among these groups, both formal and informal.”8
Thus, suppression of a network not only becomes less acceptable because of the international
elements, but also less practical due to the sheer intricacy of the system.
Yet the context of regime change as a result (at least partially) of transnational political
network activity demands a definite understanding of the nationality dimension.

That is,

network resources tend to flow into a given country rather than even or inverse resource
movement between domestic and international network constituents. Cursory examination of
this relationship pattern might imply a dependency of domestic actors upon their foreign
beneficiaries, that revolutions via such networks are steered by international elements through
their domestic consumers. Rather, the aspects of clientelism typically predominate the early
stages of network relations. It fades quickly and virtually disappears by the time domestic
network actors are prepared to challenge an authoritarian system.

“With rare exception,

domestic actors dominate the drama of regime change; external actors can influence outcomes
only by working with and through these domestic actors.”9
In the cases of color revolutions, it is appropriate to examine some of the larger NGOs
and state actors that promote healthy civil society and other conditions of democracy, which
might constitute the major international elements of a network seeking democratic reform or
revolution. Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik report that agencies and non-governmental

8
9

Ibid: 92.
McFaul, Michael. "Ukraine Imports Democracy." International Security 32, no. 2 (2007): 47.
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organizations (NGOs) like the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the
National Endowment for Democracy, the Open Society Institute, the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the European Union have deployed considerable
resources to the post-Soviet space. These entities count democratic promotion among their core
objectives. Indeed, each of their mission statements reflect this fact:






USAID: “Create a more secure, democratic, and prosperous
world for the benefit of the American people and the
international community.”10
National Endowment for Democracy: “…dedicated to the
growth and strengthening of democratic institutions around the
world.”11
Open Society Institute: “The Open Society Foundations work
to build vibrant and tolerant societies whose governments are
accountable and open to the participation of all people.”12
OSCE: “…promoting the full respect of human rights and
fundamental freedoms.”13
European Union (through EuropeAid): “European Union
believes that democracy and human rights are universal values
that should be vigorously promoted around the world.” 14

Of the resources that these organizations have committed to the post-Soviet space, Bunce and
Wolchik demonstrate that the preponderance has been focused “on elections and political-party
development,”15 that is, building blocks of stable democratic systems. The democracy assistance
and promotion of these entities has met with success most in states that: “1) have kept one foot in
the democratic door, perhaps by holding regular and at least somewhat competitive elections; 2)
have parties and a developed civil society that can act as local allies for democratization efforts;
10

“Mission Statement of the U.S. Department of State and USAID.” U.S. Department of State.
http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/dosstrat/2004/23503.htm. [Author’s italics]
11
“About the National Endowment for Democracy.” National Endowment for Democracy.
http://www.ned.org/about
12
“About Us | Open Society Foundations (OSF).” Open Society Foundations (OSF).
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/about
13
“What we do.” Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe | OSCE. http://www.osce.org/what
14
“Development and Cooperation - EuropeAid.” European Commission. ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/humanrights/index_en.htm
15
Bunce, Valerie J., and Sharon L. Wolchik. “Favorable Conditions and Electoral Revolutions.” Journal of
Democracy 17, no. 4 (2006): 13.
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3) exhibit short-term democratization-friendly trends such as increasingly competitive local
elections, popular protests, vigorous legislatures and courts, cooperation among opposition
groups, and popular opposition leaders; and 4) share borders with states that are both democratic
and similar to them.”16
To be sure, one of the more significant elements of transnational advocacy networks in
fomenting color revolution movements is the experience of previous movements and the
diffusion of tactics across borders. The success of the Otpur movement (a youth activist group)
in Serbia in the 2000 Bulldozer revolution, for instance, led to the exportation of that model –
youth advocacy under the principles of non-violent resistance and mass citizen mobilization – to
neighboring countries: Georgia’s Kmara movement played an integral role in the Rose
Revolution, Pora in Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, and Zubr in Belarus. Several methods of
transnational political networks have dispersed in similar ways, by the movement of experienced
domestic or international actors to burgeoning democratic movements in other authoritarian or
semi-authoritarian states.
Diffusion is not limited to the democratic opposition networks, however. The experience
of strongmen leaders in early color revolutions served as a warning to other regional
authoritarians. Harassment or outright expulsion of (perceived) opposition organizations or
agencies, creation of counter-revolutionary political groups and networks, and limits on electoral
competition and process observation number among the techniques developed in some countries
of the former Soviet Union to bolster undemocratic regimes. This response is understood in light
of the fact that “although most external democracy activists may indeed be primarily interested

16

Ibid: 14.
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in achieving free and fair elections, they also frequently hope that their efforts will increase the
likelihood that autocrats will lose office.”17
Evgeny Finkel and Yitzhak Brudny identify five major strategies of authoritarian
incumbents in their attempts to tactically, institutionally, and culturally preempt color revolution
movements: “isolation, marginalization, distribution, repression, and persuasion.”18 By meting
out subsidiary variations of these broad strategies, authoritarian regimes restrain societal and
foreign elements that previously generated color revolutions in neighboring countries. “This
growing backlash has yet to coalesce into a formal or organized movement. But its proponents
are clearly learning from and feeding off one another.”19
Some scholars 20 hold that robust transnational advocacy networks (with dependable
support from external constituents like USAID) precipitated regime change even in countries that
did not possess all the conditions explicated by analysts like Michael McFaul. If so, what can
the experience of democratic movements in the post-Soviet space reveal about the function of
transnational networks of support in color revolutions? What forms of international support
were present in the recent democratic movements in Georgia (2003-04), Ukraine (2004-05),
Belarus (2006), and Russia (2011-12); what was the extent of that support? What accounts for
the success or failure of color revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia to achieve
regime change? How did international networks of support – and the challenged government’s
approach to those elements – factor in the success or failure of these color revolution
movements?
17

Carothers, Thomas. “The Backlash against Democracy Promotion.” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2 (2006): 61 – 62.
Finkel, Evgeny, and Yitzhak Brundy. “No More Colour! Authoritarian Regimes and Colour Revolutions in
Eurasia.” Democratization 19, no. 1 (2012): 6.
19
Carothers, “The Backlash against Democracy Promotion”: 55.
20
See especially: Beissinger, Mark R.. “Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of
Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions.” Perspectives on Politics 5, no. 2 (2007): 259 - 276.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20446423.
18

Zeller 8

Methodology
The paper investigates four cases of democratic movements in the post-Soviet space –
Georgia, Ukraine, Belarus, Russia – from a comparativist perspective, identifying similarities
and differences in the activities of transnational networks of support in order to assess their role
in the success or failure of the movement. The examination of transnational network activity
within two successful color revolution movements (Georgia and Ukraine) and two failed
movements (Belarus and Russia) allows for an authoritative cross-referencing of causal factors.
Using Charles Ragin’s method of “Qualitative Comparative Analysis,”21 which employs Boolean
algebra and John Stuart Mill’s methods of agreement and difference, the paper combines caseoriented and variable-oriented approaches; it constructs truth tables to scrutinize the roles of
network activity and governmental response (or “backlash”) in the multi-causality of color
revolutions.

This method facilitates the analysis of convergent causal prerequisites and

conditions.
Forming comprehensive data regarding transnational networks is often difficult due to the
various sensitivities pertaining to foreign elements of domestic political phenomena.
Nevertheless, the exposure of consequential portions and general illumination of network
activities can provide a firm sense of extent and effect.

To that end, the paper marshals

expenditure data and relevant statistical information from some of the larger international
constituents of involved networks (including USAID, E.U., National Endowment for
Democracy, Open Society Institute, and so on). The paper, furthermore, cites information from
domestic organization websites and other sources to illuminate the nature and scope of their

21

For more detailed explanation, see: Ragin, Charles C.. The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and
Quantitative Strategies. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987.

Zeller 9
activity. Academic articles and news reports are used to detail government actions and events of
revolutionary periods in the specified cases.
The paper further examines the reaction of the challenged regimes to networks’
imposition.

Direct and indirect references – passages of domestic criminal codes, laws

governing non-governmental activity, and news reports of legislative and executive action – to
governmental action underscore notable instances of opposition suppression or authoritarian
backlash.
In the case of Russia’s 2011 – 2012 movement, the paper incorporates some participant
observer methods (resulting from this author’s presence in Moscow during the examined events
as an intern at Society “Memorial” and an observer of political events and happenings) in part
because a significant body of data and analytical work (relative to earlier cases) has not yet
emerged regarding the Russian movement. This direct observation contributes to an enhanced
accounting of the events and operational activity of transnational network constituents as well as
governmental counterparts.

Georgia – The Rose Revolution
On 2 November 2003, Georgia held national parliamentary elections for just the third
time since the end of the Georgian Civil War. Elections in 1995 and 1999 won pluralities for
President Eduard Shevardnadze’s party, Citizens’ Union of Georgia.22 During his presidency,
Shevardnadze’s secured financial assistance from the West and cultivated strong relations with
the United States. Despite connections to liberal democracies, Shevardnadze’s government
exercised enough control over Georgia to be accurately termed “semi-autocratic.” Georgian

22

Several other parties that supported President Shevardnadze joined with Citizens’ Union of Georgia to furnish the
President with parliamentary majorities.
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society was generally unmolested by repressive state forces (though with some notable
exceptions), but government institutions were opaque and disconnected from the citizenry.
Georgia languished domestically under a stagnant and corrupt economy, which was frequently
attributed to the wide swath of the economy controlled by members of Shevardnadze’s family.
Corruption (and nepotism) represented some of the principle charges against the governing
regime. By 2003, Shevardnadze’s position was considerably weakened: the Citizens’ Union of
Georgia had lost local elections a few years earlier and recently dissolved after several
parliamentary deputies resigned to form other parties; certain media outlets (primarily Rustavi-2)
had gained traction with their criticism of the government; and, popular opinion polls that
demonstrated the meager support for the ruling regime enfeebled Shevardnadze’s authority.23
Thus, election results that heralded a resounding victory for the parties supporting Shevardnadze
would have been suspect even without the descriptions of mass electoral fraud.
The official election results (those upheld by the Central Election Commission and
Shevardnadze) prompted large demonstrations in the Georgian capital, Tbilisi, and several major
cities. Persistent activity by the opposition parties and some diplomatic intercession pressured
Shevardnadze. He tried to convene the new parliament on 22 November, but fled the plenary
session when his speech was interrupted by the entrance of protesters (led by Mikhail
Saakashvili) carrying roses. Late the next day, after meeting with opposition leaders, President
Shevardnadze announced his resignation. Mikhail Saakashvili’s victory (with 96% of the vote)
in January’s emergency presidential election signaled the triumph of the Rose Revolution.
Transnational Networks in Georgia before the Rose Revolution

23

Welt, Cory. “Georgia's Rose Revolution: From Regime Weakness to Regime Collapse.” Center for Strategic and
International Studies 1 (2006).
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Most accounts portray Georgia before the Rose Revolution – with regards to the rights
and liberties exercised by its citizenry – as fairly open. Charges of corruption and government
opacity and intractability figured most prominently in charges against the Shevardnadze regime.
Assessments of Georgia by USAID in the half-decade preceding the Rose Revolution repeatedly
state that, those ongoing problems notwithstanding, “Georgia has a lively free press, and its laws
are among the most compliant with Council of Europe (COE) and World Trade Organization
(WTO) norms.”24 The benefits of Western – especially United States – military, technological,
and economic assistance likely mollified any apprehensions of President Shevardnadze regarding
the unfettered activity of media and civil society entities. This included the political scene,
where “criticism freely emanated from a number of sources, including political parties across the
spectrum, NGOs such as the Georgian Young Lawyer’s Association and the Liberty Institute,
and print and broadcast media. Thus, a relatively liberal environment within Georgia allowed for
the growth and interaction of civil society, including its overtly political elements.
From the beginning of Shevardnadze’s term until the elections that spawned the Rose
Revolution, international organizations and agencies engaged every sector of Georgian civil
society; politically oriented organizations had access to a wealth of resources from foreign
purveyors of grants, exchanges, information, and training. Media outlets received grants to
develop investigative reporting skills, live news coverage capability, and the mass dissemination
of information; political parties, candidates, and youth activists traveled to the U.S. to witness
American-style democratic governance, and received training in “message development,

24

See “U.S. Assistance to Eurasia: Georgia” reports in fiscal years (FY) 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003.
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campaign tactics, and constituent outreach.”25 In half a decade, Georgian NGOs and Western
agencies and organizations became deeply interconnected.
Numerous groups participated in the political sector of Georgian civil society with the
expressed purpose of promoting greater democratic governance – not an altogether insidious
goal, unless you are a semi-autocratic leader. Several prominent organizations coalesced into
what can easily be termed a “transnational advocacy network.” Major foreign/international
entities included: USAID, the Eurasia Foundation, Internews, International Center for
Journalists, Soros Open Society Institutes, National Endowment for Democracy, National
Democratic Institute, OSCE, International Republican Institute, and the British Council.26 The
most prominent Georgian presences in this network were the Liberty Institute, Internews
Georgia, Rustavi-2 (as well as other burgeoning independent media outlets), the “Kmara” 27
youth advocacy group, the Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association, and various opposition
political parties and candidates. Using joint ventures and collective initiatives, these entities
developed a politically active civil society.
Links between organizations and agencies went through a process that culminated in the
“dense connections”28 of a transnational advocacy network in the later years of Shevardnadze’s
period in office. Early relations were typically of the patron-client variety. For instance,
Rustavi-2 originally utilized the Eurasia Foundation for monetary and training resources. In
1996, two years after its founding, Rustavi-2 received a grant of $9,925.05 from the Eurasia
Foundation.29 This initial infusion of capital was bolstered when Rustavi-2, through the Eurasia
25

“FY 2001 U.S. Assistance to Eurasia: Georgia” U.S. Department of State.
http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/c8491.htm
26
This represents only some of the most visible, active organizations within this network.
27
“Kmara” means “Enough” in Georgian.
28
Keck and Sikkink. Activists Beyond Borders.
29
Anable, David. “The Role of Georgia's Media and Western Aid in the Rose Revolution.” The Harvard
International Journal of Press/Politics 11, no. 3 (2006): 9.
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Foundation, made connections with Internews, an American NGO focused on broadcast media
development. By the time of the falsified election in 2003, Rustavi-2 was a close partner of the
Eurasia Foundation; the media outlet served as the primary means of broadcasting the
discrepancies between the parallel vote tabulations (jointly conducted by the Foundation,
USAID, British Council, and the Open Society Institute) and the “official” election results.
The evolution of the Rustavi-2 – Eurasia Foundation relationship was repeated many

Figure 1: A web partially illustrating the interconnectivity of this transnational advocacy network. (graphic created by
author)

times over with several different organizations. Figure 1 depicts the links between these
organizations and some of their multi-party ventures during the Rose Revolution. This frenzied
and busy – yet oversimplified – graphic provides some idea of the intricate webs that are created
by the constituents of transnational advocacy networks. Once connections are made and become
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entrenched, it is difficult to restrict or curtail the level of interaction, that is, without incurring
great domestic and international repercussions.
Network Activity During the Rose Revolution
The Rose Revolution was a fairly compact political movement. Less than three weeks
passed between the fraudulent parliamentary elections and President Shevardnadze’s resignation
announcement. In this period, the aforementioned network of political organizations was highly
active. It constituted the major force in decisive matters that depended on opposition activity
(i.e. not factors like “division among the regime’s coercive forces”): the ability to identify voting
falsification (election monitors and parallel vote tabulation), media to publicize that information,
and opposition organized and capable of forming large-scale demonstrations.
Before the election, several organizations had prepared to certify the reliability of the
process and veracity of the results. USAID “spent $1.5 million to computerize Georgia’s messy
voter rolls.

The U.S. and European governments also gave OSCE money to deploy an

unprecedented number of foreign election observers.”30 Furthermore, the National Democratic
Institute funded monitors, exit polls, and vote counts through a Georgian NGO, International
Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED).31 Sponsored by the Open Society Institute,
opposition party leaders and youth activists – including Mikhail Saakashvili and young
Georgians who would found Kmara – had visited Serbia to study tactics of the Bulldozer
Revolution in 2000, and were thus prepared to confront electoral fraud.
Exit polls conducted during the day and released on election night by Rustavi-2 showed
Saakashvili’s National Movement party with a plurality of the vote, 20.8 percent, and thus

30

Fairbanks, Charles. “Georgia's Rose Revolution.” Journal of Democracy 15, no. 2 (2004): 114.
“National Democratic Institute Publications.” National Democratic Institute.
www.ndi.org/files/1656_ge_parlelectst_111903.pdf.
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positioned to lead the next parliamentary session. 32 Channel One (the state-owned station),
however, showed For a New Georgia (FNG) (and the pro-Shevardnadze bloc) with a narrow
advantage and the National Movement with approximately thirteen percent. Counting continued
for the next few days, but dissatisfaction and confusion prompted small demonstrations in
Tbilisi. Official state results placed the two pro-Shevardnadze parties –FNG and Revival – at the
top of the polls:33
ISFED Parallel Vote Tabulation
- National Movement: 26.60%
- FNG: 18.92%
- Labor Party: 17.36%
- Democrats: 10.15%
- Revival: 8.13%
- New Rights Party: 7.99%
- Parties under the 7% threshold: 18.84%

Central Election Commission Results
- FNG: 21.32%
- Revival: 18.84%
- National Movement: 18.08%
- Labor Party: 12.04%
- Democrats: 8.79%
- New Rights Party: 7.35%
- Parties under the 7% threshold: 13.58%

The semi-autonomous republic of Adjara proved decisive as it returned drastically inflated
numbers – votes totaling more than its entire population – for Revival party (alternatively known
as Union of Democratic Revival, Democratic Union for Revival, or Union for Georgia’s
Rebirth).
Aslan Abashidze, an authoritarian leader with ties to Russia and separatist inclinations,
ruled Adjara and was the founder of Revival party. His leadership, which began in 1991, was
born from the regional chaos of Georgia immediately after its independence from the Soviet
Union (9 April 1991). Abashidze held strong ties to Russia; over the he “not only allowed the
Russian military to maintain bases in Adjara in direct contravention of bilateral and multilateral
treaties signed by the central government in Tbilisi concerning their removal, but had cultivated

32

Welt, Cory. “Georgia's Rose Revolution”: 16 – 17.
Ibid: 18. Opposition parties are underlined (National Movement, Labor Party, Democrats, and New Rights Party).
The Labor Party and New Rights Party officially did not participate in the Rose Revolution, instead adopting a
neutral position.
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the image among citizens of Adjara that the Russian troops were the ultimate protectors of
Adjaran semi-independence.”34 Abasidze had nurtured a relationship with the leaders of Moscow
and was disposed to influence Georgian affairs (to the extent possible) so as to produce results
satisfactory to the Kremlin; in 2003, this disposition meant tipping the scales in favor of
Shevardnadze.
After four days of totaling (and tinkering with) the region’s votes, the Central Election
Commission validated the results from Adjara, which claimed 95 percent turnout. Since 1999,
Revival and Abashidze supported Shevardnadze and his parliamentary faction in return for the
understanding that Abashidze ruled Adjara with almost complete autonomy. 35 While this
arrangement functionally held together Georgia, a country with several potential breakaway
regions, it was a source of Shevardnadze’s unpopularity. In November 2003, the notion that
Adjara’s corrupt returns would be the decisive matter in parliamentary elections simply enraged
citizens in Tbilisi and the rest of Georgia.
During the week following the announcement of official results (6 November), the
opposition was highly active. The National Movement and Democrats united and, “together
with the election monitoring NGO ISFED and the Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association, filed
legal complaints in over 150 precincts and also lodged official protests against district
commissions.”36 A series of small demonstrations and counter-demonstrations materialized in
the center of Tbilisi. Several thousand constituents of the opposition protested; government
supporters protested in response. The first major protest came on 14 November when upwards
of 20,000 assembled in Freedom Square to demand Shevardnadze’s resignation and free and fair

34

Goltz, Thomas. Georgia Diary: a Chronicle of War and Political Chaos in the Post-Soviet Caucasus. Armonk,
N.Y.: Sharpe, 2006: 114 – 115.
35
Welt, “Georgia’s Rose Revolution”: 18.
36
Ibid: 21.
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elections.

While that demonstration bore no direct results, the subsequent appearance of

protesters from Adjara – bussed in to voice support for the government – spurred the opposition
to continued public protests and campaigns of civil disobedience.
During this time, the international elements of the aforementioned transnational political
network assumed the position of observers or detached commentators. Several organizations
released statements after the disparities between the official and ISFED vote counts became
apparent. The National Democratic Institute, for instance, released a statement recounting the
facts and asserting the credibility of ISFED. Yet such statements were limited to a fairly neutral
appeal for an easing of political tensions:
NDI calls on President Shevardnadze, the Georgian government and
security forces to demonstrate utmost respect for the civil and
political rights of all citizens in this tense post-election period. At the
same time, the Institute calls on all political leaders to exhort their
supporters to respect the rights of others and to act nonviolently.37
Whereas U.S. and European organizations represented the more active segment of the network
before the fraudulent elections, domestic NGOs and political actors starred in November and the
events of the Rose Revolution, but only by virtue of the tools and skills honed with the assistance
of foreign partners.
Foreign governments by and large adopted a similar posture, exhorting the conflicting
parties to peaceably resolve the crisis without interceding directly. One notable exception:
Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov traveled to Georgia in mid-November and played a key
role in brokering the resolution.38

37

“NDI Statement on the Crisis Surrounding Georgia’s Parliamentary Elections. November 19, 2003.” National
Democratic Institute. www.ndi.org/files/1656_ge_parlelectst_111903.pdf
38
“Georgians party as president steps down - Nov. 23, 2003.” CNN.com.
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe/11/23/georgia.protests/index.html
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By the third week after the elections, events in the capital and across Georgia had reached
a fever pitch. Demonstrations, though not swelling beyond tens of thousands, were persistent;
political unrest had spread to several other cities; cells of Kmara were clashing with government
supporters from Adjara; and, amid this national turmoil, President Shevardnadze moved to
convene a new parliamentary session based on the official election tabulations.
As President Shevardnadze began to address the new parliamentary session on 22
November, Mikhail Saakashvili was leading several thousands of protesters north from Freedom
Square to the Georgian Parliament Building on Rustaveli Avenue.

In the middle of the

President’s speech, Saakashvili burst through the double doors of parliament and, holding a
single rose aloft, demanded Shevardnadze’s resignation.
surrounded by his security detail.

Shevardnadze quickly absconded

Several hours later, Shevardnadze declared a state of

emergency and prepared to suppress the demonstrations by force. “At 9.30 p.m. (1730 GMT)
four armored personnel carriers, more than 10 buses and mini-buses with soldiers took up
positions outside Georgia's Interior Ministry.” 39 The military and police forces, however,
refused to forcibly disperse the protesters and compelled Shevardnadze to meet with the
opposition leaders.
In an one-and-a-half hour conference presided over by Igor Ivanov, Saakashvili and
Zurab Zhvania (head of the Democrats party) – both former members of Shevardnadze’s
government, Saakashvili as Minister of Justice and Zhvania as Chairman of parliament –
convinced Shevardnadze to resign. The announcement late on Sunday 23 November was greeted
in downtown Tbilisi with chants of “‘He has left, he has left’ and celebrated with fireworks.”40
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Mikhail Saakashvili won January’s emergency presidential election with over 95 percent.
The National Movement – Democrats coalition secured 67 percent in March’s parliamentary
elections. And, Georgia moved forward into a post-Rose Revolution government.
Effect of Transnational Networks of Support in the Rose Revolution
In Georgia, the transnational political network was most important in the run up to the
revolutionary period, serving as a preparatory force that laid the groundwork for a democratic
uprising. The international influence in the years before the Rose Revolution was indispensible
in actuating hitherto latent or underdeveloped political sectors. Foreign agencies served as nodes
of connection for other domestic and international organizations concerned with the democratic
governance of Georgia. Yet the domestic NGOs and network elements accomplished the Rose
Revolution independent of direct guidance by Western affiliates.
In the half decade before the Rose Revolution, the U.S. government alone provided
nearly $800 million in assistance to Georgia.41 This figure includes approximately $80 million
under the auspices of “democratic reform programs” and the Eurasia Foundation, which do not
account for some other services – like exchanges and training programs – that may have imbued
Georgians with wishes and designs on democratic reform. USAID, moreover, “budgeted more
democracy-related assistance to Georgia in 2002 and 2003 than to any post-Soviet state except
the considerably more populous Russia and Ukraine.”42 The immensity of U.S. government aid
combined with democracy-focused assistance from other governments and private NGOs formed
an immense arsenal for democratic reformers.

President Shevardnadze’s toleration of the

network development in Georgia, albeit perhaps without a complete understanding of the threat it
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represented to his control, ultimately enabled the success of Saakashvili, Zhvania, and the Rose
Revolution.
While it was not the only decisive factor (the police forces’ refusal to suppress the
protests on 23 November numbering among the pivotal circumstances), the determinative role of
networks of support cannot be denied in the case of the Rose Revolution. The relationships built,
resources shared, and skills acquired in the years before the parliamentary elections were evident
in the events of November 2003. Without the foundation provided by the political network of
support, the Rose Revolution’s manifestation and speedy success are dubious eventualities.

Ukraine – The Orange Revolution
In 2004, Ukraine was still just another ex-Soviet state striving to find its post-Soviet
identity. Ukraine, which has little history of independence to reference, struggled with the
pressures and responsibilities of autonomy perhaps more than its neighbors. Divergent interests
and perspectives on Ukraine’s future divided the country in 2004, especially its geopolitical
orientation.

In addition to everything else represented by 2004’s foremost presidential

candidates, Viktor Yushchenko and Victor Yanukovych embodied east-west regional priorities:
Yushchenko with domestic and international support in the West, Yanukovych with support in
east and south Ukraine and assistance from Russia.
The ten years preceding the Orange Revolution were dominated by one figure: Leonid
Kuchma. Elected in 1994 on promises of greater economic reform and progress and expanded
trade with Russia, Kuchma slowly repaired Ukraine’s ailing economy (that is, mitigated negative
growth rates) in his first term. Societal conditions were not the focus of Kuchma’s early
presidency, but neither did they escape his attention. Ukraine, like many other post-Soviet states,
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benefitted from Western financial assistance, and thus the presiding regime necessarily tolerated
a certain amount of foreign aid for democracy, civil society, and independent media. Kuchma
nevertheless exercised tremendous control over these sectors; most large media outlets
(especially television channels) were controlled by the government or oligarchs aligned with
Kuchma’s regime; NGO activity was periodically curbed by government campaigns “against
both media and civil society freedom.”43
The beginning of Kuchma’s second term saw the elevation to prime minister of future
opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko. “Pressure from Western donor countries seeking deeper
economic reforms” secured the promotion of the erstwhile Governor of the National Bank of
Ukraine. 44 Yushchenko at first cut a somewhat bland figure, that of an unassuming (albeit
capable) banker. Ukraine’s economy flourished under his policies, reaching nearly six percent
GDP growth in 2000 and 9.2 percent in 2001. 45 His tenure furthermore coincided with
successful resolution of “Ukraine’s most urgent social problems: wage arrears to teachers, health
care workers, and other state employees and overdue pension payments to retirees.”46
Under the duress of an opposition protest campaign aimed at removing him from office –
the “Ukraine without Kuchma” campaign – President Kuchma dismissed Yushchenko for fear of
his potential political force. The move, however, “transformed him from a technocrat into an
opposition leader with a strong public base.”47 His party, Our Ukraine, made a strong showing
in 2002 parliamentary elections. By 2004 it was clear that the dynamic Yushchenko and the
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united opposition – festooned with orange (the color of Our Ukraine) scarves, ribbons, and flags
– was well-positioned to defeat Kuchma and his hand-picked successor, Yanukovych.
Transnational Networks in Ukraine before the Orange Revolution
Activity in Ukraine’s non-governmental sphere of politics and regime opposition was
periodically inhibited by government interference. The measures employed were usually limited
– focusing most frequently on independent media – and temporary, however. Even in cases of
media repression, civil society lobbying often dissuaded Kuchma from implementing serious
legal restrictions: due to advocacy by the National Association of Broadcasters, for example,
“President Kuchma vetoed a media law that would have required TV stations to produce election
debates even if an outlet could not afford to do so” (effectively forcing the closure of smaller,
independent media stations).48 Overall, Ukrainian NGOs and their Western partner agencies and
organizations had largely unfettered maneuverability, albeit with sporadic fits of government
harassment.
Perhaps by virtue of its geographic importance and large population (approaching 50
million, the second largest post-Soviet state population behind Russia), or perhaps because of its
perceived importance in the post-Soviet order of Europe, Ukraine profited from large amounts of
democracy assistance and civil society development aid, proportionally more than any other state
in the former Soviet Union. In the decade before the Orange Revolution, the U.S. government
alone annually provided Ukraine with well over $200 million, with “democratic reform
programs” typically comprising 25 percent of that aid.49 Economic aid, moreover, created an
expanded middle class, which largely “resented the latticework of corruption that constantly
ensnared them – from politically motivated multiple tax audits to shakedowns by local officials
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connected to business clans,” and thus added to the population disaffected by Kuchma’s
regime.50 Throughout the late 1990s the Kuchma regime appeared reasonably comfortable in
controlling the commanding heights of the government and society (the largest media outlets and
important industrial sectors like natural gas were owned, operated, or heavily influenced by the
government), while significant opposition development was underway as a result of transnational
network development in other sectors of society.
USAID in particular implemented an astounding range of programs. Both directly and
through a number of implementing partners and subsidiary organizations, USAID sought to
strengthen Ukrainian NGOs and build resilient centers of political activity. The Counterpart
Alliance for Partnership, U.S.-EU Transatlantic Initiative, the U.S. Embassy’s Democracy
Commission, the National Endowment of Democracy, the Eurasia Foundation, and the Freedom
House Partnership for Reform in Ukraine (PRU) – all partially funded or enacted by USAID –
furnished thousands of NGOs with small grant and public policy think tanks (about $10,000 on
average) in order to promote “youth initiatives and leadership,” “engage policy makers,” and
“battle against corruption.”51 This last cause particularly engendered an assault on the Kuchma
regime, which was seen as the bastion of an endemic system of corruption.
In late 2000 Kuchma, reelected just over a year before, was implicated in a massive
government corruption and crime scandal. His former bodyguard had surreptitiously recorded
and released conversations where “Kuchma is heard dispensing favors, paying massive
kickbacks, and conspiring to suppress his opponents – making it clear that the president sat at the
head of a vast criminal system.”52 The tapes also incriminated Kuchma in the abduction and
murder of journalist Georgy Gongadze three month earlier. This factor severely undermined
50
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Kushma’s already precarious standing. The jailing of former Deputy Prime Minister Yulia
Tymoshenko in early 2001 and dismissal of Prime Minister Yushchenko in May further
weakened Kuchma.
The revelations of the so-called “Cassette Scandal” energized Ukraine’s opposition
NGOs and activist groups. Ahead of the 2002 parliamentary elections, activity and connections
within Ukraine’s opposition political network expanded and flexed its muscles.

Ex-Prime

Minister Yushchenko joined the growing opposition. He traveled around Ukraine delivering
speeches and holding rallies. “These meetings helped create networks of civic and party activists,
crucial in the organizing of mass protests.” 53

The interpersonal connections created by

Yushchenko’s personal political activism created the opportunity for domestic and transnational
partnerships to form, as well as broadening his base of support and increasing his political
capital.
Political party development activity accompanied the pre-election fervor. The NDI and
IRI expanded programs to train opposition political candidates and campaigns. Hundreds
annually participated in thorough instructional seminars on citizen-oriented politics and election
and campaign techniques. Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine party was one of many to benefit from
these services.
Despite the extreme intimidation tactics exercised by the Kuchma regime, “Ukrainska
Pravda 54 and Ukraine’s other independent media outlets did not fold or practice selfcensorship.”55 Yet government “manipulation of broadcasting licenses, restriction of distribution
networks, and…revised criminal and civil codes, which allowed individuals and companies to
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sue for defamation on many pretexts” pressured non-state news sources.56 In the face of this
harassment, U.S. government support almost single-handedly sustained numerous independent
media sources in the two years before parliamentary elections. The U.S. Embassy’s Media
Development Fund offered hundreds of thousands in grant money for non-state newspapers,
radio stations, and TV outlets. Internews, funded by USAID, provided more grants as well as
training and lobbying services that thwarted the passage of several laws that would have
eliminated most independent media.
A slew of other Western governmental agencies and NGOs contributed to the
development of civil society and democratic functioning of Ukraine. The Charles Stuart Mott
Foundation and the International Renaissance Foundation (funded by George Soros) supported
domestic polling agencies. Pora, a student organization modeled on the examples of Otpur
(from Serbia) and Kmara, received financial support and training from Freedom House, NDI,
IRI, the German Marshall Fund, and the Canadian International Development Agency. 57
Furthermore, several youth advocates – members of Pora and Znayu – attended seminars on
activism and mobilization strategy, “supported by the Alfred Moser Foundation (Netherlands),
the Westminster Foundation (UK), and the Fund for European Education (Poland).”58
Finally, several international support agencies partnered with a handful of Ukrainian
NGOs to mobilize voters and monitor the conduct of the 2002 elections. Most prominently,
Committee of Voters of Ukraine (CVU) received assistance from USAID, EU, OSCE, Internews,
NDI and others. The CVU produced election-related public service announcements, conducted
voter mobilization drives, and trained and deployed a few thousand election monitors. By and
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large, these measures were highly effective at monitoring election conduct and fairness. The
consensus of international and domestic monitors was that the parliamentary election was free
and fair.
Our Ukraine won nearly a quarter of parliamentary seats, the most of any one party in the
2002 elections. The Ukrainian parliament remained somewhat independent of Kuchma as a
result of the election, a fact that would prove integral to Yushchenko’s tactics during the Orange
Revolution. The efficacy of the various preliminary and election measures of NGOs, political
parties, and independent media outlets prompted “another anti-NGO campaign through the
winter of 2003-4, this time backed by Kuchma’s new strong-arm Chief of Staff Victor
Medvedchuk and his normally reliable allies, the Communist Party of Ukraine.” 59

The

transnational political network was by now firmly established, however.
Examination of the opposition political sphere at this juncture reveals a resilient network
that, with little alteration (the most notable exception being the 2003 creation of the Channel 5
television station), would lead the Orange Revolution in two and a half years. The major
constituents included:
International Actors
The U.S. (especially USAID)
European Union
NDI
IRI
Internews
Eurasia Foundation
Freedom House
OSCE
NED
ENEMO61
German Marshall Fund
Westminster Foundation
59

Domestic Actors60
Committee of Voters of Ukraine (CVU)
Democratic Initiatives Foundation
Znayu
Kiev International Institute of Sociology (KMIS)
Razumkov Centre
U.S.-Ukraine Foundation
Radio Era, Radio Kiev, and Radio Gala
Our Ukraine party
Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc
Chysta Ukraina (‘Proper Ukraine’)
Black Pora*
Yellow Pora*

Wilson, “Ukraine’s Orange Revolution…”: 22.
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Liberty Institute
Channel 5*
Canadian International Development Agency
World Bank
Charles Stewart Mott Foundation
Soros’s International Renaissance Foundation
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
These actors collaborated closely in the interlude between the parliamentary elections and 2004’s
presidential vote. Some parts of this network even formalized their association, such as the
Freedom of Choice Coalition, which was comprised of several Ukrainian NGOs and opposition
groups. This combined resources of many NGOs produced an authoritative election monitor and
analysis hub (through a website, www.campaign.org.ua), especially effective at tracking
campaign spending.62
The success of Our Ukraine made Yushchenko the opposition’s frontrunner for the
presidency. A weak showing by Yulia Tymoshenko’s party, moreover, prompted her to align
with Our Ukraine and support Yushchenko’s bid, rather than running herself in 2004.
The encouraging results in 2002 stimulated an upsurge in opposition activity and
international support. Our Ukraine’s strong showing activated hitherto passive international
elements. Even as the U.S. scaled back its overall aid to Ukraine – corresponding to a general
deterioration of relations with Kuchma – democratic assistance remained fairly high and indeed
seemed larger to the opposition, which was receiving a greater proportion of the resources.
Consistent government corruption and money laundering at the expense of U.S. political party
and governance development prompted a reallocation of resources:
The [aid and development programs operated by USAID
subsidiaries and partners] benefitted all the main political parties,
including supporters of both Yushchenko and Yanukovych, and
even many of the fake parties set up by supporters of Yanukovych.
A large proportion of foreign funding therefore rightly went to the
government side, yet it was the government side that was often
62
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accused of removing monies for partisan use or personal benefit.
This was one reason for the scale-back of funding in 2003; the
West was increasingly reluctant to fund projects involving
compromised, high state officials. A partial consequence was that
the West worked more with the regime’s critics thereafter. 63
While the U.S. earmarked a greater share of its resources to the opposition political sector, other
international actors committed greater capital and assets to Ukraine. For instance, Soros’s

Figure 2: A web partially illustrating the interconnectivity of this transnational advocacy network. (graphic created by author)

International Renaissance Foundation spent “$1.65 million between Autumn 2003 and December
2004” in support of the Freedom of Choice Coalition and activist opposition groups.64
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Domestic parts of the network responded to this bolstered support not only by
intensifying their projects and pre-election preparations, but also by expanding. Petro
Poroshenko, an ally of Yushchenko, established Channel 5; it covered both campaigns (as
opposed to the state-owned media that had largely ignored Yushchenko) and usually portrayed
Our Ukraine in a positive light. Although Channel 5 had a broadcast reach of only 37 percent65
(only available on cable), “it was popular in Kiev and several other cities” from whence the
preponderance of support for the revolution would originate.66
Training sessions and lessons from former leaders of Kmara (Georgia) and Otpur
(Serbia) led to the creation of Pora (meaning “It’s time”), a Ukrainian youth activism
organization with two wings: Yellow Pora, a political party focused on the continued diffusion
of youth activism tactics, and Black Pora, a domestically-focused body geared toward unseating
Kuchma.
The government, however, did launch several efforts aimed at curtailing this activity and
obstructing Yushchenko’s operations. At Kuchma’s behest in December 2003, the parliament
established “an ad hoc commission to investigate foreign and foreign-funded NGOs involved in
election-related activities.”67 Yushchenko was attacked and impeded in several ways in the year
before the election. Government-controlled media berated him many times over; obstructing or
harassing his travels; and, regime forces were likely behind the poisoning of Yushchenko with
dioxin that nearly killed him and permanently scarred his face.
Stunningly, opposition activity proceeded apace, irrespective of harassment from the
coalition of forces marshaled by Kuchma, Yanukovych, and the Putin regime, which provided
advice and assistance to Kuchma and Yanukovych. Almost every member of the opposition
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political network participated in massive voter mobilization campaigns.

Funded and

operationally assisted by USAID and the U.S.-Ukraine Foundation, Znayu conducted extensive
“voter education and get-out-the-vote efforts, recognized by friends and foes as contributors to
Yushchenko’s electoral success.”68 A joint initiative by Freedom House, NDI, IRI, and the U.S.Ukraine Foundation performed similar services in conjunction with local NGOs.
The CVU, Pora, Our Ukraine, Internews-Ukraine also took steps to win over the public
support of Western governments ahead of the election. “Elite networks between Our Ukraine
leaders and Western leaders nurtured Our Ukraine allies in the West when debates erupted in
Washington and European capitals about how to respond to the Orange protesters.”69
In sum, the U.S. and other Western governments spent approximately $65 million in
2003 and 2004 in direct support of the opposition, and over $18 million in election-related
assistance. Private organizations and donors added several millions more. By the first round of
the presidential election on 31 October 2004, a trained, experienced, and well-equipped
opposition network stood ready to enforce its democratic prerogatives.
Network Activity During the Orange Revolution
From the first round of voting on 31 October to the second round revote on 26 December,
the transnational democracy network in Ukraine deployed immense resources to monitor and
tabulate the election, protest fraud and illegitimacy, and seek redress of evidence-based
grievances. Network activity peaked in the months of November and December 2004 as the
sinewy bonds connecting its constituents flexed in order to safeguard Ukrainians’ electoral
rights.
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Several NGOs recruited and trained election monitors and observers. The CVU, with
funding and instructional assistance from USAID and NDI, “fielded 10,000 domestic monitors
(accredited as journalists) for each round of the 2004 Presidential elections.”70 The OSCE, IRI,
NDI, and the U.S.-Ukraine Foundation deployed several hundreds of international observers.
And, NDI and Freedom House secured the involvement of a large ENEMO monitoring team,
“which comprised 1,000 observers from seventeen electoral monitoring organizations in
formerly communist countries.”71 As part of its mission, a detachment of the ENEMO team
“visited 4,392 polling stations and more than 200 of the 225 territorial election commissions”
during the second round of voting. In total, more than 12,000 observers monitored Ukraine’s
Presidential elections, a staggering number unmatched in post-Soviet history.
The other main voting day measures were exit polling and parallel vote tabulation.
“Eight Western embassies (the U.S., U.K., Canada, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Norway,
Sweden, and Denmark) and four NGOs (the NED, Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, Eurasia and
George Soros’s Renaissance Foundation), helped fund the exit polls in each of the three
rounds,” 72 coordinated by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation and conducted by the Kiev
International Institute for Sociology (KMIS) and the Razumkov Centre.73 The CVU organized a
parallel vote count and its own exit poll. These exhaustive methods formed the vanguard of vote
legitimacy battle in Ukraine.
The magnitude of the efforts were not excessive either; after a first round of voting
significantly less tainted by electoral irregularities (wherein Yushchenko and Yanukovych each
received approximately 39 percent), the observers, monitors, and pollsters encountered a second
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round (on 21 November) rife with sophisticated barrages of voting fraud and election rigging.
First of all, votes were falsified at the precinct level (i.e. the lowest level of the voting system) –
through stuffing of the ballot box, “carousel” voting, the removal of votes for Yushchenko, and
pens filled with disappearing ink in areas of high support for Our Ukraine – where it is most
difficult to trace. These methods were not exposed by the CVU’s systematic vote tabulation,
which relied on figures reported by the precincts. Election monitors, however, noted these
activities and recorded evidence that would prove integral in Yushchenko’s follow-on legal
appeals. In addition to those precinct-level falsifications, the Central Election Commission
(CEC) inflated turnout in the eastern regions (especially Donetsk and Luhansk) that supported
Yanukovych, adding “approximately 1.2 million new votes – well over 90 percent of which went
to the regime’s favorite.”74 Exit polls, by KMIS and the Razumkov Centre and by the CVU,
accounted for and discarded practically all falsification and showed Yushchenko with a 53 - 44
percent lead over Yanukovych, a stark contrast to the official figures: a 49 - 46 victory for
Yanukovych; “the exit poll established what was credible, and what was not.” 75 The CVU
claimed that 85,000 local officials conspired in the government’s fraud, resulting in over 2.8
million counterfeit votes for Yanukovych.76
It should be noted that a few members of Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) aided the
opposition’s detection of electoral fraud. “In the days before and after the runoff vote, a highranking SBU official had kept in regular contact with Oleh Rybachuk, Yushchenko’s chief of
staff,” as the liaison for the SBU operatives which gathered intelligence about ploys to rig the
election by the Kuchma regime.77 This intelligence gathering included wiretaps on calls between
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Viktor Medvedchuk and Yuri Levenets, a Yanukovych campaign advisor, where the two
colluded in schemes of mass voter fraud. The evidence collected by the SBU would prove vital
to the Yushchenko campaign’s voter fraud suit to the Supreme Court.
Cries of foul play arose in the middle of Election Day from the Yushchenko camp, which
called for mass demonstrations to prevent the government from completing its fraud.
Independent media outlets significantly aided this call to action by publicizing the disparate
results of the exit polls and the CEC’s official count.

Channel 5 and Ukrainska Pravda

experienced huge spikes in their audiences in the days after the vote since they were reporting
the struggle underway. Responding to the Yushchenko campaign and independent media, over a
hundred thousand turned out in the evening on 21 November to denounce the electoral fraud.
Protests erupted in several other cities the next day, including upwards of 500,000 in
Kiev. Amidst that chaos, “Yushchenko declared himself president and took the oath of office in
an abbreviated session of parliament.”78 His swearing in received some coverage by the stateowned television stations, which were pressured by the success of Channel 5 to cover the
opposition movement.
Public demonstrations grew, nearing a million in Kiev. A “tent city” was set up on a
street adjoining the centrally-located Independence Square, also known simply as “Maidan.”
This massive and continual street presence, largely maintained by Pora activists and a few key
NGOs, sustained the protest movement and appreciably complicated the logistics of government
suppression. McFaul writes:
Kuchma and his supporters, including those in Moscow, did
contemplate using coercion to stay in power. Measuring the
distribution of power between state and society, however, was not an
abstract exercise during the Orange Revolution; calculations about
power could be made based on concrete assessments of crowd sizes
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and unified will among those in the state wielding coercive power.
Democratic society was simply too powerful to repress. 79
The pressure of hundreds of thousands of nearby protesters coupled with appeals from
the Yushchenko campaign convinced the CEC to defer to the parliament rather than proceed with
the certification of the vote. The parliament, in turn, sent the issue to the Supreme Court.
Deciding on 3 December 2004, “the court used evidence of fraud collected by the CVU and
other NGOs to annul the official results and call for a replay of the second round later that
month.” 80 Parliamentary speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn, aided by the Presidents of Poland and
Lithuania and the E.U.’s Foreign Affairs Commissioner, “brokered the specifics of a
comprehensive agreement. It featured significant new protections in the election law to reduce
the potential for voter fraud.”81
After a generally more open (most notably in terms of media coverage) miniature
campaign, Ukrainians cast their ballots for President once again on 26 December. The regional
divisions remained; Yushchenko won the west and center of the country, Yanukovych the east
and south. The much cleaner election resulted in a 52 – 44 percent victory for Yushchenko,
mirroring exit poll results from a month earlier. President Yushchenko’s inauguration on 23
January 2005 completed the Orange Revolution.
Effect of Transnational Networks of Support in the Orange Revolution
In the months after his inauguration, Yushchenko and his campaign team thanked foreign
support, especially from the United States, for Ukraine’s democracy, civil society, independent
media, and so on. Western influence both directly and through domestic organizations arguably
prevented Ukraine from devolving into a full authoritarian system, and instead limited it to a
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vulnerable semi-authoritarian scope. The large proportion of foreign funding in civil society –
“by some estimates, at least 80 percent”82 – created a large sector with ties to liberal democracies
of the West rather than the Kuchma regime. “Intellectual and financial imports from the West
helped to strengthen Ukraine’s democratic opposition and offset resources transferred from
Russia” in support of Kuchma and Yanukovych, 83 which some estimate at more than $410
million (in campaign and election support alone). 84 That the opposition network prevailed
against this massive injection of Russian funds for Yanukovych (much more than aggregate
Western support for Yushchenko in the election year) speaks to the strength of a well-trained and
active network.
The highly visible division of international support – the West for Yushchenko, Russia
for Yanukovych – rhetorically factored in Ukraine’s campaign as well. Support from the U.S.
for Yushchenko prompted derisive remarks from the Yanukovych camp such as referring to him
as “Bushenko.” Yet the sentiment underlying such jeers most likely denoted wider appeal for
Yushchenko; that is, a majority of Ukrainians consider themselves European and their country
rightfully placed in the company of the West. NGOs and local organizations that received
Western support also gained a sort of perceptional boost, an extensively attractive seal of
approval from the West. While it certainly would not help in eastern Ukraine, where greater
sympathy for Russia predominates, the perception of Yushchenko and the opposition network as
Western probably won them support in contentious electoral regions.
However, there appears to be no evidence to support the theory that Western donor
organizations and agencies unevenly distributed aid and grants.
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governmental entities may have insisted on regional balance of assistance so as to avoid
recriminations of outright bias. The recipient domestic actors are fairly accorded responsibility
for the manner in which outside assistance was used. The east-west division in Ukraine’s
Orange Revolution was symptomatic of longstanding regional differences and largely unaffected
by the Western democratic donors.
More so than in Georgia, the ruling Ukrainian regime challenged the transnational
network with measures aimed at restricting their activity. While the authoritarian backlash of
Kuchma’s regime did not quite equal other cases (as the examples of Belarus and Russia will
show), the pressure exerted was significant and testifies to the strength of the democracy
network.
In the delicate balance of governmental and societal forces in Kuchma’s semiauthoritarian regime, the influence of external constituents of the democracy network was
significant.

As those organizations curbed Ukraine authoritarian development, they

simultaneously strengthened the media, opposition parties, civic organizations, and activist
groups, all of which were vital factors in the success of the revolutionary movement.
“The Orange Revolution was a contentious struggle for power between a semi-autocratic
regime and a democratic opposition, in which the opposition had enough power – the necessary
strategies, resources, and popular support – to prevail.” 85 The development of democratic
opposition by Western resources and the formation of lasting partnerships and connections
precipitated the defeat of governmental forces. Effects of the examined transnational advocacy
network were fundamental to the democratic victory in the Orange Revolution.
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Belarus – The Denim Revolution86
Belarus represents one of the most politically backward and stagnant cases of the former
Soviet Union. Whereas its closest ally – the Russian Federation – experimented with liberal
democracy in the 1990s, Belarus elected Alexander Lukashenko to the presidency in 1994 and
now, nearly twenty years later, he remains the leader of Belarus. Obviously, the democratic
norm of constitutional term limits is not present in Belarus; that is, President Lukashenko got rid
of them in a controversial referendum in 2004 (shortly before the end of his hitherto maximum
second term in office). Though it is a fully authoritarian state, Belarus has held regular elections
since the adoption of its constitution in 1994. These democratic procedures in an otherwise
undemocratic state have served as flashpoints of Belarusian opposition activity, including the socalled “Denim Revolution” movement after the 2006 presidential election.
Alexander Lukashenko’s early post-Soviet political career had two definite
characteristics: a uniquely reactionary stance on Belarusian independence and a record of anticorruption. He gained prominence as the head of an anti-corruption commission, where he
issued largely unsubstantiated (though not incredible) charges of corruption to scores of highranking officials – including the Defense Minister, two vice-premiers, and the speaker of the
parliament.87 As for the former characteristic, “Mr. Lukashenko prided himself on the fact that
he was the only political leader from the country who voted against the Brest pact of 1991, which
proclaimed the end of the Soviet Union.”88
Despite Lukashenko’s steady consolidation of power, opposition activity persisted in
Belarus. Public protests sprang up around the presidential election of 2001 and the parliament
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and referendum votes of 2004. Protests and opposition activity proceeded apace in the months
before the 2006 presidential election. During one of the more notable demonstrations, in Minsk
on 16 September 2005, police confiscated protesters’ independence flags; 89 Mikita Sasim, a
youth activist, responded by removing his jean (or “denim”) shirt and using it as a flag. An
extremely popular product in the former Soviet Union, denim evoked not only this incident, but
also the West. It quickly became one of the opposition’s key symbols, combining an object of
preexisting cultural importance with a tactic borrowed from other color revolution movements;
mobilization efforts typically contained statements like “Come out in the streets of your cities
and towns in jeans!”90
On the night (19 March) of the 2006 presidential vote, a huge crowd – estimated between
15,000 and 20,000 – formed in October Square in downtown Minsk. Those assembled supported
the united opposition candidate Alexander Milinkevich (or else, opposed Lukashenko) and cried
foul the official election results which declared Lukashenko the victor with 83 (or as much as 86)
percent.
For the next week, October Square was occupied by a fluctuating, though nevertheless
continuous group of denim-clad revolutionaries. On 25 March, the movement ended with a
frenzied clash of protesters and riot officers on Okrestina Street. What opposition network, if
any, was at work in the Denim revolution; why did it fail to change the Belarusian regime?
Transnational Networks in Belarus before the Denim Revolution
Aside from a brief reprieve in the early 1990s under the leadership of Stanislav
Shushkevich, Belarus never experienced the sort of post-Soviet recession of governmental
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control – which typically engendered civil society and opposition development – that occurred in
the rest of Eastern Europe. Alexander Lukashenko’s ascension to the presidency heralded anticorruption, a focus on economic growth, and above all stability. Like all other former Soviet
republics, Belarus’s economy in the early 1990s was marred by negative growth and corruption.
Reversal of these trends represented Lukashenko’s foremost governing mandate, which he not
unreasonably associated with stability. That guiding principal, asserted Lukashenko, meant a
return (or the closest arrangement) to its indissoluble connection to Russia and the elimination of
opposition, either to that plan or anything else he decided upon.
Referenda in 1995 and 1996 acted on these judgments, reinforcing economic ties with
Russia and emasculating parliament, practically the only institution capable of countering the
power of the presidency. These developments and criminal code reform aimed at restricting
Belarusian society resulted in the adoption of a policy of selective engagement by Western
countries. The E.U. restricted its aid to Belarus, in the words of the European Neighborhood and
Partnership Instrument, “to humanitarian or regional projects or those which directly support the
democratization process.”91 Similarly, “virtually all U.S. Government assistance to Belarus is
targeted at the country’s non-governmental sector, particularly those NGOs that are working to
promote the development of civil society and the free flow of information.”92 The total aid
package of the Western governments, therefore, was significantly less than any other country in
the region.
Furthermore, whereas the level of private organizations and funds from abroad ranged
from small to considerable elsewhere in the post-Soviet space, it was essentially non-existent in
Belarus. George Soros, for example, established a branch of his foundation in Belarus in 1994.
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However, harassment through tax audits and resulting fines amounting to $3 million forced its
closure in September 1997, ending roughly three years of support (encompassing $13 million) in
Belarusian education, ecology, health care, and civil society. 93 Other private organizations
forced out of Belarus by government persecution include even the most innocuous NGOs, such
as the “United States-based City of Hope, which distributes food and clothing in Belarus, and the
German-financed Chernobyl Children’s Fund.”94 Thus, even before the rash of color revolutions
in the former Soviet Union, Lukashenko had instituted policies of “authoritarian backlash.”
Before detailing the networks that underwrote the Denim Revolution, we must examine
the state-controlled parameters that circumscribed non-governmental activity. Unencumbered by
the notions of integration with the West that had somewhat restrained Shevardnadze and
Kuchma, President Lukashenko created an extensive legal system to control society. Changes to
the Belarusian constitution and criminal code in the 1990s established great latitude for the state
and its security apparatus – comprised of the KGB, Internal Affairs agencies, Presidential
Security Service, Ministry of Defense, and border police – in combatting terrorism, preventing
money laundering, and regulating the movement of assets within and across the country’s
borders. Decrees issued by Lukashenko further restricted activity; Presidential Decree No. 8:
“On the Registration Procedure for Foreign Gratuitous Aid” instituted strict regulations on the
influx of foreign aid to non-governmental organizations. In sum, the Belarusian government had
an extensive and complex legal system that could be easily stretched and construed to pursue
targeted NGOs and political parties.
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Surreptitious means of repression accompanied these legal developments.

Several

opposition politicians, human rights activists, and critics of the regime have disappeared during
Lukashenko’s tenure.

Opposition figures of obvious popularity and significant influence

vanished, like Yury Zakharanka (former Interior Minister) and Viktor Gonchar (a former deputy
prime minister). Vocal critics too went missing; Dmitri Zavadsky, a cameraman who had
covered Lukashenko and later the conflict in Chechnya, “accused government ministers of
selling arms to Chechen rebels fighting against Russia” 95 disappeared on 7 July 2000;
businessman and philanthropist Anatol Krasouski supported Viktor Gonchar and went missing
the same day as him, on 16 September 1999. This sort of Stalinist activity represented the
Lukashenko regime’s most intimidating, though not infrequently used, tools.
The government took further steps to confine opposition activity in the months ahead of
the 2006 election. “A new housing code in early 2005 led to the closing of nearly three-hundred
local political-party offices that had been lodged in residential properties but which found
themselves forced by the change to seek space in hopelessly overpriced office buildings.”96 A
new law required the registration and licensing of NGOs and specified activities. “Running an
unregistered NGO, training people in mass-protest techniques, organizing an NGO or political
party said to ‘hamper execution of its members’ work and family duties,’ or ‘defaming’ the
Belarusian republic in the international arena” numbered among the new prohibitions, punished
by fines and jail terms of up to three years.97 Pavel Seviarynets, the leader of Young Front – a
youth activist group similar to Kmara and Pora – was one of many opposition figures arrested
due to purported violations of this new portion of the criminal code. In May 2005, he was
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sentenced to two years or corrective labor in Maloye Sitna, a tiny village near Belarus’s northern
border with Russia. 98 In effect, several influential opposition figures like Seviarynets were
exiled to the periphery of Belarus, far from the centrally located Minsk, for the months before
and after the presidential vote.
Nevertheless, that vast arsenal of repressive mechanisms notwithstanding, a small but
resilient transnational network of opposition operated in Belarus.

Its size and scope were

significantly less than its “rose” and “orange” counterparts. Indeed, it is much easier to form a
nearly comprehensive list of its constituents:
International Actors
Domestic Actors
The U.S. (especially USAID) Zubr (meaning ‘Bison’), a youth activist group
European Union
Young Front
NDI
Charter 97
IRI
IISEPS
NED
Office for a Democratic Belarus
Internews
Partnership
Eurasia Foundation
Belarusian Initiative Center
Freedom House
Belarusian Association of Journalists
OSCE
Narodnaya Volya, Nasha Niva, Belarusy i Rynok
Counterpart Alliance for Partnership
(newspapers)
ABA/CEELI99
United Civil, ‘Fair World,’ Social Democrats,
U.N. Development Program
Popular Front (political parties)
International Labor Org.
Independent Trade Union, Free Trade Union,
European Radio Belarus
Organization of Working Women (unions)
In the decade before the Denim Revolution, the U.S. government and its agencies
(including USAID, NDI, IRI, Eurasia Foundation, and NED) spent over $250 million in support
to Belarus.100 About half of this assistance was in the form of humanitarian aid from the U.S.
Department of Defense and privately donated commodities. The other half – or approximately
$125 million – funded typical operations, though on a much smaller scale than in previous cases.
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IRI and NDI worked closely with local branches of the major opposition parties, and
conducted training and seminars through organizations like the Belarusian Initiative Center.
USAID-funded Internews projects engaged local television stations – though this ultimately
proved ineffectual as the medium of television was the primary tool of Lukashenko’s propaganda
and therefore was tightly controlled by the state. USAID worked with most of the nation’s print
media, including the major opposition newspapers: Narodnaya Volya (“the People’s Will”),
Nasha Niva (“Our Field” or “Our Land”), and Belarusy i Rynok (“Belarus and Market”); a large
part of the focus was adapting the newspapers to web-based formats, a policy that has had farreaching consequences in Belarusian opposition activity. The American Bar Association through
its CEELI program provided legal advice and assistance to NGOs and political parties,
mitigating the strain of government harassment.

Grants from the U.S. Embassy, Eurasia

Foundation, NED, and Freedom House provided thousands of grants “in support of independent
print and electronic media, youth and women’s groups, human rights groups, independent trade
unions, and other pro-democracy organizations.”101
The E.U. provided some minor support as well. Approximately $11 million (€8 million)
in TACIS (Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States) funds went to Belarus in
2005-2006. 102 Over $7 million of these funds went into projects that supported education,
training, media, and other forces for democratization. The E.U.’s main implementing partners in
these ventures were the OSCE and the U.N. Development Program.
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Perhaps the most notable aspect of the transnational network at work in 2006 was its very
evident attempts to formalize sub-networks. The major opposition political parties, acting on the

Figure 3: A web almost wholly illustrating the interconnectivity of this network. Note that the transnational connections
are fewer and weaker than in previous cases. (graphic created by author)

advice of NDI workers, united in the “Ten Plus Coalition, a group of democratic parties and civic
organizations.”103 The Coalition’s Congress of Democratic Forces in October 2005 nominated a
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presidential candidate, Alexander Milinkevich, to represent the united opposition. The Office for
a Democratic Belarus, the Belarusian Association of Journalists, and several other organizations
joined in the Assembly of Democratic NGOs to promote the development of civil society. Such
associations certainly multiplied the efficacy of the opposition network. The combined efforts of
these sub-networks, for instance, “raised the nationwide name recognition of [Milinkevich] from
5% before the [nominating congress in October] to nearly 100% just prior to the elections.”104
Government pressure, nevertheless, was unrelenting. Several NGOs and parties were
forced to close or to reduce operations drastically due to pressure from the government. Most
notably, the Independent Institute for Socio-Economic and Political Studies (IISEPS) and the
NGO Partnership were incapacitated during the election season. IISEPS, a polling agency
aiming to “promote civil society and free market economy in Belarus,”105 was handicapped by a
court order in early 2005 that revoked their license for conducting polls. Partnership was
Belarus’s only domestic election-monitoring group; several of its principals were arrested a
month before the election on, among other indictments, charges of terrorism. Video of the
leaders’ confession to their crimes was publicized days before the election.106 Thus were two
important elements of previous color revolutions, polling and election monitors, severely
undermined. Indeed, the entirety of the opposition – independent media, political parties, and
NGOs (all of which were so vital to color movements in previous cases) – were squeezed by
official and unofficial state pressures in the months ahead of the elections, so that opposition
activity was severely restricted by March 2006.
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Finally, Lukashenko utilized state resources throughout the last weeks before to his
greatest advantage. While impeding Milinkevich’s travel throughout the country, Lukashenko
continued his most longstanding campaign tool: symbolic politics.107 State television portrays
Lukashenko as a dynamic figure, and conveys “the impression of a very personal supervision of
society.”108 He is shown playing hockey, attending a ceremony of the nation’s gas industry,
driving a large truck on a farm, inspecting a mining operation, and meeting with world leaders.109
Milinkevich, by comparison, received practically no coverage by national media aside from a
brief speech at the registration of presidential candidates ceremony.
The 2006 presidential election figured to be just another pretense to shore up
Lukashenko’s “democratic” regime.
Network Activity During the Denim Revolution
No opposition media outlets covered the election.

Government forces prevented

independent newspapers from issuing copies, “web pages were shut down, and the independent
news agency Belapan also ran into difficulties.” 110 State television proclaimed victory for
Lukashenko and warned of possible attempts by the opposition to overthrow the government.
The reported figures held that Lukashenko had received 83 percent of votes, Milinkevich
6.1 percent, Haidukevich (a pro-Lukashenko candidate) 3.5 percent, and Kazulin (an opposition
candidate aligned with Milikevich’s supporters) 2.2 percent. The U.S., E.U., and OSCE all
declared the elections illegitimate; Russian monitors criticized the West for prejudging the nature
of the elections, and deemed the process free and fair. Responding to vague calls by opposition
leaders before and early on Election Day, several thousand Minsk residents gathered in October
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Square to protest the results. Few of the protesters claimed victory for Milinkevich; rather, they
claimed that Lukashenko’s percentage was impossibly high, citing “non-governmental polls,
such as those conducted by Manayev [a sociologist with the IISEPS], indicate that support for
the president at the time of the election was around or over 50%.”111
It remains unclear exactly how the electoral fraud was perpetrated. A documentary about
the Denim Revolution, Kalinovski Square, briefly explained that a poll in one town (Maloye
Sitna) supported Milinkevich at 70 percent; the official results recorded 95 percent of the town’s
votes for Lukashenko.112
In any case, upwards of 20,000 had gathered in October Square by late election night to
decry the clearly fraudulent vote count, “despite KGB threats to charge protesters with terrorism
and press for the death penalty.” 113 Members of Zubr and Young Front – many of whom
witnessed the Orange Revolution sixteen months earlier – organized the demonstration, erection
of a tent city, and occupation of the square. However, there was “little in the way of planning or
coordination between civil society radicals and opposition leaders.”114
The number of protesters diminished in the following days. No signs of dissention within
the regime or state-controlled media appeared as in previous cases. Indeed, the media’s limited
coverage of the protest was consistently defamatory and scathing. State security forces arrested
anyone attempting to exit or enter the square and intercepted all food and provisions brought for
the demonstrators. Groups of Lukashenko supporters were deployed as counterdemonstrators
and agitators. Finally, when the number of protesters had dwindled to a few hundred on 24
March, riot police stormed the square, arrested the 328 remaining occupants, and dismantled the
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tent city.115 The next day, Alexander Kazulin led several thousand (between 5,000 and 20,000)
in a march back to October Square, but a wall of riot officers blocked the way. The march
instead moved towards the detention facility on Okrestina Street, where many of the detained
protesters were supposedly being held. The police dispersed the march in “a bloody melee that
left thousands beaten up, several of them in grave condition, tear-gassed, stunned with
percussion grenades and chased all over town by club-wielding policemen.”116 The only tangible
result of the Denim Revolution movement was an eight-day delay in Lukashenko’s reinauguration ceremony.
Effect of Transnational Networks of Support in the Denim Revolution
Most of the keys to successful color revolutions were missing in Belarus and the Denim
Revolution movement. Lukashenko is an unconstrained autocrat; he is fairly popular (over 50
percent approval in almost any poll); the regime’s security apparatus is united behind him; and
the mobilizing ability of the opposition was severely encumbered by government harassment and
suppression.
Although there were no exit polls or parallel vote tabulations, the opposition did not
contend that their candidate(s) had received more votes than Lukashenko. An IISEPS poll weeks
after the election approximated the real results at 63 percent for Lukashenko, 20 percent for
Milinkevich.117 Opposition activity successfully made Milinkevich into a national figure; he
never exuded the dynamism of Saakashvili or Yushchenko. For his part, Lukashenko admitted
to election falsification, albeit in the opposite direction. In a meeting with Ukrainian journalists,
Lukashenko said:
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We falsified the last elections, I already told the westerners. 93.5
percent voted for Lukashenko. This is not a European figure, they
said. So we made it 86… Before the elections they told us that if
our election figures were European, that they would accept our
election. We made European figures. But, as you see, they didn’t
accept them.118
The question under circumstances like those in Lukashenko’s Belarus is: “can a
democratic opposition make any progress by taking part in such a twisted process – one which,
moreover, is designed to destroy whatever faith society might have in alternatives to an
authoritarian regime? The case of Belarus suggests that the surprising answer is yes.”119 Even in
the face of harsh authoritarian suppression, a small, insufficiently supported but nevertheless
interconnected opposition in a network system can reach elements of society beyond its base of
activists, dissidents, and opposition politicians. The surprise is not that the Denim Revolution
movement failed, but rather that it occurred at all. The regime was simply not vulnerable to
revolution, but the unprecedented public dissent arguably occurred because of the resilience of
the opposition network, erected as it was with the help of foreign partners and utilized in March
2006 by its domestic constituents.

Russia – The For Fair Elections movement120
The Russian Federation, representing the largest country and principal heir of the former
Soviet Union, became the greatest focus of post-Soviet international aid. Foreign government
aid to Russia in the 1990s surpassed $1 billion per annum; the total influx of private aid most
likely approached this figure.
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An explosion of free societal activity characterized Russia during Boris Yeltsin’s
presidential tenure (1991 – 1999). Yet, besides opening Russia up to foreign donors, agencies,
and organizations, the newfound and unchecked freedom resulted in unprecedented corruption.
Government officials and unscrupulous “oligarchs” used their influence to enrich themselves
with formerly state-owned industries and businesses.
Vladimir Putin’s regime, in place since late 1999, has done much to decrease this
rampant oligarchical corruption. The reassertion of state predominance under Putin, however,
has extended to virtually all sectors of society, not just industry. Since Putin’s ascension to the
presidency, the government – not always with Putin’s public endorsement, though seemingly at
his behest – has implemented numerous restrictions on the allocation of foreign aid and the free
operation of political and civil society entities. Understandably, various actors and individuals,
chafing from these constraints, rallied to Putin’s opposition. Yet, among the many disaffected
members of Russian society – pensioners, communists yearning for a return to the Soviet system,
ethnic minorities, and nationalists to name a few – democrats are just another group of the
relatively small, active opponents of Putin’s regime.
Nevertheless, the reinvigoration of authoritarian practices in Putin’s Russia has triggered
substantial opposition activity.

From the early 2000s to the middle of President Dmitri

Medvedev’s121 tenure (2010), anywhere from dozens to a few thousand people participated in
public demonstrations of opposition to Putin or some facet of his regime. Shortly before the
December 2011 parliamentary or “Duma” elections, however, protest activity was epitomized by
the actions of Strategy-31 activists.
121
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abridgement of constitutionally-enshrined (in article 31) freedom of assembly, attempted to hold
regular protests at Triumfalnaya Ploshchad (“Triumphal Square”) in central Moscow on the 31st
day of every month with 31 days. Over the course of two hours on 31 October 2011, a few
dozen activists shouted slogans and interacted with the scores of journalists while hundreds of
riot officers (easily more than four to every activist, journalist, or layperson in the square)
patrolled the scene, continually ordered people to vacate the square, and wrestled active
protesters from the crowd and escorted them to a chorus of “Pozor! Pozor! Pozor!” (“Shame [on
the police]!”).
Then, widespread claims of fraud in the 4 December parliamentary elections provoked an
impromptu gathering the next day of over 5,000 whistleblowers (many protesters blowing on
plastic red whistles), denouncing the electoral falsification. Five days later (on 10 December) a
crowd of tens of thousands (between 25,000 and 80,000 depending on whether one inquired with
the police or with the protest organizers) assembled on Bolotnaya Ploshchad (“Marshy Square”).
The outpouring of opposition was the largest seen in Russia since the collapse of the Soviet
Union. It kicked off a sustained campaign by the political opponents of Putin’s regime to
demand fair elections and protest in the public spaces of Moscow and other Russian cities until
that “reasonable demand,” among others, was met. Over a year as well as the presidential
election (4 March 2012) and inauguration (7 May 2012) have passed and the opposition has
achieved no substantive victories in changing the regime.

Indeed, Putin’s return to the

Presidency coincided with a new assault on political opposition and civil society by the Russian
government. The opposition movement that began on 4 December 2011 is still limping on as of
the beginning of 2013.
Transnational Networks in Russia before the For Fair Elections Movement
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Color revolutions in bordering countries most definitely provoked a government backlash
against potentially revolutionary elements in Russian society. Putin has expressed concern over
the movements in a characteristic mocking style:
‘What is most dangerous, you know, is the creation of a system of
permanent revolution, whether that be “rose” [rosovykh] or some
yet-to-be-invented “blue” [golubykh].’ In this sentence, he attacked
the ‘Rose Revolution’ on two levels. First, in an attempt at
homophobic humor, he played on the Russian slang meanings of
‘rose’ as lesbian and ‘blue’ as gay male. Second, he tried to
tarnish Georgia’s deliberately self-limiting revolution with the
notion of ‘permanent revolution’, which both harked back to
Soviet anti-Trotskyite propaganda and evoked memories of
Russia’s turmoil during the early 1990s.122
While a firmer hand with civil society and “foreign interference” was detected in his first
presidential term, Putin oversaw the passage of a seminal piece of legislation in early 2006: the
Russian Federation Law, On Introducing Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian
Federation, more commonly known as the 2006 Russian NGO Law. The shorter, less cryptic
title speaks to the target of the legislation. The law “introduced burdensome and difficult-tomeet reporting requirements for NGOs, accompanied by severe penalties for non-compliance;
new and similarly burdensome registration procedures for Russian and foreign NGOs operating
in Russia; and new broad powers of the registration bodies to audit the activities of NGOs.”123
The pretext of the law came from FSB Director Nikolai Patrushev’s May 2005 speech to
parliament, where he asserted that foreign agents (explicitly naming IRI and NED) “were using
NGOs to undermine Russia’s security. 124 Like with other parts of Russian law, NGOs and
opposition groups feared the “selective implementation” practices of government organs; that is,
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the law would be a tool used to pursue organizations of concern to the government, rather than
being applied fairly to all civil society (a daunting prospect on its own). The application of this
and other Russian laws – especially the Law on Public Associations, the 2002 Law on
Countering Extremist Activity, and certain articles of the Criminal Code, like articles 280 and
282125 – shrank the number of NGOs from over 600,000 to just 220,000.126
Within this hostile environment, an enlarged but familiar (USAID, NDI, IRI, NED, E.U.,
Soros’s Open Society Foundation, Internews-Russia, and so on) group of foreign organizations,
agencies, and governments provided regular assistance to squeezed sectors of Russian society.
Millions of dollars flowed from foreign organizations and governments to Russian grantees. In
2010 alone, George Soros’s Foundation dispensed over $6 million to a dozen Russian
organizations.127 NED, supported by USAID, provided $4.15 million in the form of 74 grants,
including $71,242 for election polling by the Levada Center, $46,902 for the development of the
East European Democratic Center’s “crossborder network of civil society organizations,”
$80,000 for AGORA’s legal defense initiative, and $325,961 over seven project grants to
branches of Society “Memorial.”128
Some of the most notable Russian opposition beneficiaries of the transnational network
are:
Notable Russian actors:
Solidarity (Solidarnost), liberal democratic party coalition
Strategy-31, activist group
Yabloko (“apple”), political party
People’s Democratic Union, political party
Golos (“voice”), election monitoring group
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Dozhd (“rain”) television channel
Society “Memorial,” a human rights and historical truth organization
The Other Russia, a political party coalition
Carnegie Moscow Center, think tank
AGORA, human rights watchdog group
Levada Center, polling and sociological research institute
The Khimki Forest Defense Movement, environmental activist group
Echo of Moscow, radio station
A Just Russia, political party
Novaya Gazetta (“New Gazette”), newspaper
In recent years opponents of the Putin regime have made several attempts to formalize domestic
sub-networks and create greater unity. A slew of untenable party coalitions and conventions like
2004’s All-Russian Civic Congress endeavored to create deep, resilient, and longstanding bonds
of opposition unity. The vast ideological disparities between opposition forces, however,
hindered the establishment of sustainable coalitions. Furthermore, Russia’s opposition consists
of several influential leaders, each with their own base of support. This reality constituted a
major obstacle to opposition unity; the For Fair Elections movement would reconnoiter this
problem and only manage to create a system that froze the parity of opposition leaders’
popularity.
Though not fully seized upon, the array of political parties, non-governmental
organizations, and international sources of support was vast. The Putin government, unlike any
other cases, went beyond simple authoritarian methods of cowing the opposition; it developed
several proactive, ostensibly non-governmental means of disrupting or countering opposition
activity.
Gleb Pavlovskii, advisor to the Kremlin, pioneered new defenses against color movement
opposition.

He asserted, “The most important thing to avoid was a passive, defensive

posture.” 129 Accordingly, a network of counter-revolutionary groups was created. The most
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well-known element of this apparatus is the pro-Putin youth group, Nashi (meaning “Ours”). It
was created on the model of Otpur and Kmara, but for the purpose of bolstering rather than
opposing the regime. Since its formation in 2005, detachments of Nashi members frequently
stalked and harassed opposition demonstrations, practically unchecked by the police no matter
what their provocative action.
The government also utilizes state-owned or aligned polling and media sources to
undermine opposition activity. Critics often lambast the All-Russian Center for the Study of
Public Opinion, or VTsIOM for manipulation of polling and surveys in favor of the Putin
regime. Citizen Watch, an election monitoring NGO with ties to the government, acts as a progovernment mirror to Golos. Media outlets too form part of the governments network; NTV, for
example, habitually conducts “investigative reports” aimed at exposing the purportedly corrupt
and seditious practices of opposition parties, leaders, and organizations. NTV functions with a
fair degree of impunity and rarely falls prey to Russia’s harsh libel laws (though their conduct,
by many accounts, often qualifies as libelous).
In spite of the various and extensive tactics employed to stifle and disrupt, the opposition
to Putin’s regime persevered. Indeed, pervasive decline in the popularity of ruling party United
Russia gave hope to the opposition. Levada Center polls indicated diminished approval of
United Russia and consistent doubt regarding the veracity of elections (see Appendix I). The
December 2011 parliamentary vote represented a significant opportunity for anti-Putin forces,
but little confidence could reasonably exist that any mass outburst of dissent would occur
following the vote, whether it was falsified or not.
Network Activity During the For Fair Elections movement
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Examining the course of events from 4 December 2011 to 7 May 2012 and beyond
requires one to contend with the distinctively non- (or even anti-) color revolution atmosphere of
early protests. Golos tracked the conduct of the elections throughout the country via a series of
volunteer monitors and live video streams of polling places. An online mapping application –
developed in part with USAID and NED funds – that differentiated between many types of
electoral fraud made access to accounts of the vote’s fairness available to everyone with an
internet connection. In all, Golos recorded 7,801 cases of fraudulent activity.130 The official
figures, which were already underwhelming for United Russia as it signaled the loss of the
legislative super majority that they had held since 2003 and was consistent with diminishing
popularity in local elections, were further palled for the party of power by widespread incidents
of fraud:131
-

United Russia: 49.31 percent
Communist Party: 19.19 percent
A Just Russia: 13.25 percent
Liberal-Democratic Party: 11.68 percent

Perhaps the domestic entity most disposed to a network system (boasting strong ties both to
international partners like USAID, NED, OSCE, and the Open Society Foundation, and to
domestic actors like Society “Memorial” and the Sakharov Centre), Golos was able to withstand
intense pressure from the regime before and after the election period. Cyber-attacks, government
raids, harassment by NTV, Nashi demonstrations outside their office, and fines number among
the assault tactics employed by the regime. Despite these hindrances, Golos fielded a few
thousand official election monitors (and utilized supplementary volunteers and distance
observation methods) during the parliamentary vote. A statement the day after the elections
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announced preliminary findings: support for United Russia was inflated throughout the country,
especially in the Caucus regions (such as the Chechen Republic which recorded 99.5 percent for
United Russia) and in the districts of Moscow (with wild variation between districts, indicative
of vote tampering). 132 Subsequent reports confirmed these findings and questioned United
Russia’s already subpar performance.
While these reports fueled opposition outrage, the protest movement that thereafter
coalesced under the banner of “For Fair Elections” did not adopt a revolutionary posture.
Speeches at December’s protests often declared that the objective was fair elections, not
revolution. Indeed, the rhetorical moderation in calls to action often strained to declare, perhaps
for the benefit of the ubiquitous forces of the interior ministry, that this was not a color
movement. This stance might have resulted from two related polling concerns. First, while
some speculation amongst independent polling agencies and protesters placed United Russia’s
total percentage of the vote in the low 30s, sometimes even in second place to the communists,
clearly either United Russia or the Communist Party (typically in agreement with the ruling
United Russia) had won the election. Second, the level of Putin’s popularity had not matched the
plummeting of United Russia’s support. Over half the country still approved of Putin, and thus
no mandate for regime change existed on any front. Yet the tens of thousands that gathered on
Bolotnaya Square a week after chanted slogans like “Russia without Putin!,” “Russia will be
free!,” “we have the power!,” and so on. Hints of a more radical tenor appeared from the likes of
Alexei Navalny (a lawyer and anti-corruption blogger with the largest support base of opposition
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leaders), who said proclaimed to the nearly 100,000 assembled on Sakharov Avenue on 24
December: “We are peaceful people, but we cannot suffer endlessly.”133
Through the first two months after elections, the For Fair Elections movement made no
visible progress on achieving its main objectives, which, though sometimes obfuscated by the
many voices of the oppositions leadership, can be said to include the annulment of the 4
December election results, a new vote conducted freely and fairly, and the resignation and
investigation of Central Election Commission Chairman Vladimir Churov.
The first major demonstration after the long Russian holidays was held on 4 February
2012, a march from Kaluzhskaya Square to a rally on Bolotnaya. Braving subzero temperatures,
well over 100,000 people turned out to denounce the Putin regime and the parliamentary
elections. Stamping their feet and rubbing their hands (or in extreme cases, going to the
warming tent at the opposite end of the square), the assembly listened to speeches and musical
performances. Late Soviet anthems of dissent such as Viktor Tsoi’s song “Peremen” (“Change”)
and live performances from the likes of Yuri Shevchuk harked back to the dissent of the late
1980s and early 1990s.
The 4 February rally also witnessed the elaboration of a fiercely nationalist message.
State-owned media and government officials had denounced or dismissed the nascent democratic
movement as an instrument of Western intervention in Russia’s internal affairs – a common
charge, and one to which Russians seem to be particularly sensitive. The response of several
opposition figures was to deny the claim, assert their distaste for America, and allege Putin’s
collusion with the U.S. Left Front leader Sergei Udaltsov typified this development:
[Government counterdemonstrations] accuse us, alleging that we are acting on the
interests of the USA, that we want to split up Russia. But, I am here saying it’s
lies and provocation; lies, b*******, and provocation! Excuse me for the coarse
133
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word. In 1999, when America bombed Yugoslavia, I was by the embassy, there
throwing s*** at the American embassy with everyone…But where was Putin
then? Where were you? Where was Medvedev? … That’s who works in the
interests of America.134
Whereas Western support constituted almost a point of pride in Georgia and Ukraine, the
existence of U.S.-assisted opposition elements was shameful to several major leaders of the For
Fair Elections movement, who perhaps feared the general public’s supposed antipathy to
American elements in Russia. While the West
disapproved

of

the

conduct

of

Russia’s

elections, the comments of Udaltsov and others
surely did not elicit the kind of diplomatic
pressure that bolstered Yushchenko and Our
Ukraine.
For Fair Elections leaders were denied a
permit to demonstrate once more before the 4
March presidential election, so they organized
an event called “White Circle.”

On 26

February, as many as 40,000 people 135 lined
Moscow’s Garden Ring Road, festooned with
white ribbons, holding white balloons, and
waving white flags and flowers.

Opposition leaders were interspersed along the ring;

sympathetic motorists drove around the 10-mile
loop, holding flags out their windows and
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honking in support (or else because the protest was causing several traffic jams); and, groups of
pro-government youth activists deployed at several points along the road and wore signs that said
“Putin loves all” or “one week until Putin’s victory”.
The Presidential election was held on 4 March. No major protest was scheduled for that
evening, but the anticipation of more fraud led opposition leaders to prepare for a rally the
following night. Official results and state media heralded a clear, decisive, and legitimate
victory for Vladimir Putin:136
-

Vladimir V. Putin: 63.6 percent
Gennady A. Zyuganov (Communist Party): 17.18 percent
Mikhail D. Prokhorov: 7.98 percent
Vladimir V. Zhirinovsky: 6.22 percent
Sergei M. Mironov: 3.85 percent

While few if any doubted that Putin legitimately won at minimum an overwhelming plurality,
Golos did monitor claims of fraud, registering 5,229 instances on its website. Irregularities were
concentrated in cities (especially Moscow and St. Petersburg) and in southern Russia, where
places like Rostov region reported 146 percent turnout. Such comical signs of fraud provided
fodder for subsequent protests: “Elections cannot be fair when all 146% don’t vote” read one
woman’s sign at a rally on 10 March.137 A teary-eyed victory speech by President-elect Putin
similarly provoked the ire of opposition protesters: “Moscow does not believe in tears”
(referencing a movie from the late Soviet period) appeared on several placards at the 5 March
demonstration.
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The rallies on 5 and 10 March involved “crowds of just 10,000 to 25,000,”138 signaling to
some that the fervor of dissent was waning. Violent action by riot officers at the end of the 5
March event on Pushkin Square, moreover, did not bode well for the opposition. Hundreds were
arrested – including Sergei Udaltsov, Alexei Navalny, and Ilya Yashin – in that melee on the
pretext that they violated the terms of their assembly permit and did not vacate the Square by
nine o’clock.
To be sure, the loose alliance enshrined in the For Fair Elections movement, already
fraying by some accounts, had one last seminal event to plan around: the Presidential
inauguration on 7 May 2012. Udaltsov, on behalf of the movement, obtained a permit once
again to march from Kaluzhskaya Square to Bolotnaya and hold a rally there on 6 May. The
week before the demonstration witnessed a massive influx – hundreds of thousands – of
additional interior troops and riot officers as well as detachments of the specialized ODON
division (a unit of the Interior Ministry).
In the early hours of the afternoon, between 25,000 and 40,000 exited the Oktyabrskaya
metro station and assembled on the broad thoroughfare north of Kaluzhskaya Square. After
waves of protesters – principally under the direction of Udaltsov and Left Front activists –
situated themselves behind several banners endorsing the ouster of Putin, the two kilometer
march began. At the end of that road just beyond the entrance to Bolotnaya stood three lines,
each a few men deep, of interior ministry troops and riot officers. Behind these lines were tight
formations of service vehicles, troop carriers, buses, and windowless Black Marias.
When the main body of the march neared Bolotnaya, a line of troops blocked their access
via the western bridge. Some protesters crossed a footbridge to the east, but most remained on
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the boulevard. Groups began attempting to push through the police lines and march on the
Kremlin. It remains unclear what role opposition leaders played in attempting to march to Red
Square. For his part, Udaltsov was on the eastern end of Bolotnaya Square (having crossed the
footbridge) when clashes began. Speaking from the previously constructed dais, he encouraged
the hundreds gathered on the square to join the rest of the demonstrators in occupying the area.
While delivering this announcement, Udaltsov was taken under arrest by several police officers
and rushed away from the square to the northeast. Alexei Navalny and Boris Nemtsov were
captured and evacuated in the same manner.
Violent altercations between riot officers and protesters continued into the evening.
Protesters pelted troops with bottles, debris, and a few Molotov cocktails. Roving groups of riot
officers penetrated the ranks of the demonstrators and seized aggressive individuals. Slowly,
after dozens of police and protester injuries and several hundred arrests, the demonstrators
dispersed, trudging back toward the Oktyabrskaya metro station.
The next day, opposition activists were driven away from the route of Putin’s inaugural
convoy. As President Putin took the oath of office, bands of a few thousand protesters, police
forces, and pro-government youth groups played an extended cat-and-mouse game on the streets
of the city center. A youthful group of protesters headed southward on Nikitskiy Boulevard in an
attempt to approach the Kremlin via Noviy Arbat, but found their path blocked by a wall of riot
troops. They wheeled round and headed north to Pushkin Square (and supposedly from there
down to the Kremlin via Tverskaya Street). Nashi activists delayed them at the southern end of
the Tverskaya Boulevard Park. After a half-hour march, during which troop carriers sped
passed, the march met a line of police opposite from Pushkin Square. The officers dispersed the
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march, drove back the demonstrators, and detained scores. Various news reports describe similar
events around the city.
Back in the President’s office, Putin wasted little time; new restrictions on NGO activity
and public assemblies passed during his first months in office, including drastic increases in fines
for unsanctioned protests (a sixty-fold increase for culpable individuals, and forty-fold for
organizations) and a bill requiring domestic NGOs in receipt of foreign grants or monies to carry
the label “foreign agent,” a moniker with adverse Soviet connotations.139 Among the myriad
other recent government actions designed to restrict opposition network activity, the Kremlin
demanded the evacuation of USAID from Russia in late September 2012. Even if some of its
operations are conducted in absentia, the expulsion of the U.S. government’s largest conduit of
foreign aid raises existential concerns for the already weak transnational opposition network, as
it is currently constituted.
Effect of Transnational Networks of Support in the For Fair Elections movement
In the five-month period between State Duma elections, the presidential election, and
Putin’s inauguration, demonstrations and public displays of civic unrest “took place in 96 cities
across the country.”140 An almost inestimable number of international and domestic actors –
with a correspondingly high diversity of motivations, methods, and goals – contributed to the
swell of anti-government activism. The For Fair Elections movement of Moscow and other
major cities was perhaps the most prominent of these opposition exertions.
Like other color movements, For Fair Elections fought governmental tampering with the
citizenry’s electoral rights. In all likelihood (as in Belarus in 2006), a free and fair vote would
not affect the outcome of Russia’s presidential vote, merely the margin by which Putin secured
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victory, nor would legitimate elections greatly altar the nature of the Duma.

Thus, the

opposition’s struggle was one of principal and not of practical reality.
Unlike other cases, Russia’s opposition did not fully exploit the resources possessed by
its transnational network of support. Some domestic actors worked with Western partners while
others abhorred the thought. Such wide divergence of opinion and position typified the For Fair
Elections movement and resulted in loose affiliations and tenuous bonds uncharacteristic of
effective transnational networks.
Furthermore, the concept of one alliance uniting several distinct communist, socialist,
democratic, and fascistic nationalist factions and interests is laughably unsustainable. It would
surely test the bonds of a sturdy network system, and quickly unravel weaker associations (as it
did in Russia). Indeed, given the ideological disparity among the For Fair Elections coalition, it
is a wonder that more groups did not mimic Society “Memorial” and refuse to join the
movement, citing the futility of aligning with parties that hold virtually no other (besides distaste
for the Putin regime) values in common.141 This fundamental weakness speaks to the necessity
of unifying values to bind a transnational network. In Russia, while leaders like Garry Kasparov
and Boris Nemtsov called for liberal democratic regimes modeled on the West, several of their
partners in opposition were championing profoundly different political realignments: Sergei
Uldatsov calling for a return to a Soviet system, Vladimir Tor advocating a radically nationalist
regime, and so on.
Most importantly, the opposition network faced a regime with the most sophisticated
repression and counterrevolutionary measures yet encountered in the post-Soviet space.
Studious observation of and experience with color revolutions in adjacent countries effectively
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inoculated Russia against the “democracy virus.” The efficacy of the pro-government network –
Nashi, NTV, VTsIOM, etc. – attests to the strength of networks of support.
In the absence of a fully developed transnational network of support, the opposition still
achieved unprecedented mass mobilization and clearly engendered concerns among the top rungs
of state authority. This fact should prompt concerns within the Putin regime of the potential
power of the opposition if those comprehensive network methods are employed. The swift
restrictive actions of the reinstated President Putin indicate an understanding of the opposition’s
capacity to agitate for change.

Assessing Transnational Networks in Color Movements
Placing the potential causal factors – including the presence of transnational networks,
the strength of existing networks, and the degree of authoritarian backlash – in a “truth table”142
creates a precise structure to test the role of observed variables in the sociopolitical phenomena
of color revolutions.
Table 1 presents possible elements of successful color revolutions. Therein, A resilient
interconnected web of independent media outlets, NGOs and political parties, and foreign donor
organizations agencies constitutes a “strong network.” “Significant authoritarian backlash”
corresponds to the implementation of a restrictive legal framework that hinders transnational
network activity as well as the exercise of governmental and extra-governmental means of
opposition harassment and suppression.
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Case

Successful
color
revolution
?

Significant
SemiDivision United
Unpopular
Transnational Strong
network? authoritarian autocratic? among
network(s)
opposition? incumbent?
backlash?
regime’s
present?
coercive
forces?

Georgia
200304
Ukraine
200405
Belarus
2006
Russia
201112

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Table 1: A truth table of potential causal variables of color revolutions in the examined cases.
(created by author)

As the table shows, the presence of a strong transnational network is positively correlated
with successful color revolution. Conversely, significant authoritarian backlash – such as the
restrictive laws and state harassment in Belarus, and the moderate legal harassment and
persistent agitation of pro-government networks in Russia – is inversely related to color
revolution.
Other variables may contribute to the capacity of a color movement to achieve regime
change. The presence of a central, unifying revolutionary figure is surely a significant factor.
Saakashvili and especially Yushchenko were vital to their movements, whereas Milinkevich was
fairly obscure before the 2005-06 presidential campaign in Belarus, and Russia’s opposition
contained numerous influential figures without one of paramount importance. The timing and
nature of election cycles may also represent a weighty condition. Belarus’s presidential election
was not preceded by parliamentary elections; furthermore, Election Day was scheduled for 19
March possibly to discourage would be protesters from demonstrating in freezing temperatures.
Nevertheless, these and other conditions and factors are probably of ancillary importance.
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In so far as their unfettered operation bolsters and fundamentally contributes to the
strength and skill of crucial opposition sectors – election monitors and pollsters, independent
media, mobilizing groups, and political parties – transnational networks constitute an integral
element of a successful color revolution movement. Cooperation within a strong, if perhaps
informal network system acts as a sustainable multiplier of opposition resources and potency.
Conversely, weak networks may deliver surprising results, but simply cannot be sustained
effectively over long periods.
The case of Russia’s For Fair Elections movement demonstrates the essential fact that
transnational advocacy networks are necessarily value-driven. The absence of a core of unifying
values handicaps the formation of a resilient and interconnected web of organizations, agencies,
and political parties. Vast ideological incongruence among the For Fair Elections movement
prevented it from congealing into anything more sturdy and robust than a loose association with
a common enemy.
The dynamic of a strong network faced with significant authoritarian backlash
(unobserved in the four cases presented in this paper) undoubtedly would clarify the extent of a
transnational networks’ decisiveness in color revolution movements. This eventuality, however,
is unlikely due to the reciprocal nature of opposition networks and governing regimes. In other
words, a sufficiently liberal sociopolitical environment, which allows for transnational network
development, is incompatible with an authoritative governmental system capable of generating
substantial and persistent measures of network suppression.
The potentially decisive role (along with other revolutionary characteristics) of
transnational democratic networks in precipitating and effectively navigating color revolutions
has not escaped the notice of other (semi-) authoritarian regimes in the post-Soviet space (and
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beyond). In the wake of revolutions in Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine, a trend of so-called
“authoritarian backlash” spread throughout the hitherto unchallenged authoritarian states in
Eastern Europe and Eurasia. Innovative and sweeping measures that empowered coercive forces
to harass incessantly and that created parallel networks to cow the opposition using a system that
mirrored their organizational strength.

With a set of well-developed tools, specifically

counterrevolutionary mechanisms and (or at least) an unwavering coercive apparatus,
authoritarian regimes have neutralized transnational democratic networks and forestalled wouldbe color revolutions. Thus, successful color revolution is highly unlikely in cases without the
intra-regime preconditions, no matter the strength of an opposition network (although, an
internally secure regime typically produces a correspondingly weak opposition).
A well-established transnational democratic network represents one essential factor in
winning color revolution movements.
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Appendix I
Levada Center polling regarding United Russia and elections:143
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